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L'égalité est un concept moral et politique traduit en termes juridiques. 
Il n'existe pas de notion universellement acceptée du concept d'égalité. 
Il n'existe pas non plus une définition unique de ce qu'est la discrimination, 
l'interdiction de la discrimination étant la formule négative du principe de 
l'égalité. 
De plus, lorsque nous parlons de minorités, nous pensons en termes de 
minorités linguistiques, ethniques ou religieuses, respectant en cela la 
classification de l'article 27 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et 
politiques '. Cet article prévoit spécifiquement le droit des personnes appar-
tenant à ces minorités de ne pouvoir être privées d'avoir, en commun avec les 
autres membres de leur groupe, leur propre vie culturelle, de professer ou de 
pratiquer leur propre religion ou d'employer leur propre langue. 
Cependant, le Pacte ne confère pas aux minorités de droits en tant que 
collectivités, mais précise que les personnes appartenant à des minorités 
doivent jouir des droits qu'il confère. 
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Outre le droit des minorités, le Pacte reconnaît aussi spécifiquement le 
principe du droit à l'égalité sans discrimination, notamment de race, de 
couleur, de sexe, de langue, de religion, d'opinion politique ou d'origine 
nationale2. 
Ce n'est pas en vertu de l'article 26 qui interdit la discrimination que le 
Comité des droits de l'homme de l'ONU s'est prononcé dans le cas Lovelace, 
mais en vertu du droit des minorités : 
Dans le cas de Sandra Lovelace, il faut prendre en considération le fait que son 
mariage avec un non-Indien a été rompu. Il est naturel que, dans une telle 
situation, elle désire retourner vivre dans le milieu dont elle est issue, d'autant 
plus que depuis la dissolution de son mariage elle se trouve de nouveau 
culturellement liée surtout à la bande des Indiens Maliseet. Quels que puissent 
être les mérites de la Loi sur les Indiens à d'autres égards, il ne semble pas au 
Comité qu'il soit raisonnable, ni même nécessaire, pour préserver l'identité de 
la tribu, de dénier à Sandra Lovelace le droit de résider dans la réserve. Le 
Comité conclut par conséquent que refuser de reconnaître son appartenance à 
la bande constitue un déni injustifiable des droits que lui garantit l'article 27 du 
Pacte, considéré dans le contexte des autres dispositions précédemment 
mentionnées.3 
Quant à une définition de l'expression discrimination, elle n'est pas 
uniforme. 
Dans la Convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de 
discrimination raciale4, l'expression «discrimination» vise: 
... toute distinction, exclusion, restriction ou préférence fondée sur la race [...] 
qui a pour but ou pour effet de détruire ou de compromettre la reconnaissance, 
la jouissance ou l'exercice, dans des conditions d'égalité, des droits de l'homme 
et des libertés fondamentales dans les domaines politique, économique, social 
et culturel ou dans tout autre domaine de la vie publique.5 
Ce double volet se retrouve dans la Charte québécoise des droits et 
libertés de la personne6. Pour sa part, la Charte canadienne des droits et 
libertés7 ne définit pas la discrimination et n'interdit pas spécifiquement 
l'effet discriminatoire8. 
2. Article 26. 
3. Communication R.6/24. 
4. Entrée en vigueur pour le Canada le 13 novembre 1970. 
5. Article 1(1). 
6. L.Q. 1975, c. 6; L.R.Q., c. C-12, a. 10. 
7. Loi de 1982 sur le Canada, annexe B, 1982 (R.-U.), c i l . 
8. Article 15. 
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1. The Concept of Equality 
Although seemingly a paradox, in order to treat some persons equally, 
we must treat them differently. The recognition of different means requires 
that we may have to treat some persons differently in order to enhance 
equality. Treating all in the same way may perpetuate inequality since 
disadvantaged groups cannot take advantage of equal treatment. The 
disadvantaged groups or persons aspiring to equal treatment could need 
equality of opportunity in our society. 
Somewhere between the theoretical extremes of the state as a neutral arbitrator 
of a fairplay game and as the realizer of absolutely equal shares there is an 
understanding of equality which recognizes the achievement of an overall 
balance of burdens and benefits [that] requires a recognition of different needs 
within a broad framework of equal rights.9 
Viewed from this angle, difference should be acknowledged. The trend 
is to the effect that we should explicitly take differences into account in order 
to respond appropriately to them. "Neutral equality", meaning one which 
ignores differences for all purposes, would increase the gap between such 
groups and the majority. Recent studies have revealed that we should take 
note of the differences in order to achieve greater equality. If, for instance, 
we think in terms of physical disability, we should not ignore it when 
providing education. In the report of the Commission on Equality in 
Employment, we read that "sometimes equality means treating people the 
same, despite their differences, and sometimes it means treating them as 
equal by accommodating their differences" 10. 
It is important at this point to mention that affirmative action programs 
are not precluded as infringing on equality rights. The Charter authorizes 
such programs implying that different needs are recognized. 
Section 15(2) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as 
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups. Since affirmative action is a tool for remedying the disadvantages 
and the Charter clearly recognizes that such programs can exist and do not 
violate equality rights, we can assume that what the government had in mind 
is equality of opportunity. 
If affirmative action programs are challenged under 15(1), the defense 
lies under subsection 2. This provision does not create a right to affirmative 
action nor does it provide for an authority to create such programs. As a 
9. J. MCCALLA VICKERS, "Majority Equality Issues of the Eighties", (1983) Can. Human 
Rights Y.B. 47, p. 57. 
10. Made public in Canada in December 1984 (The Abella Report). 
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remedy under section 24, such programs could be imposed by a court. Could 
we, however, argue that the government has obligations to take necessary 
steps to ensure that such programs exist? 
2. Constructive Discrimination or the Adverse Effect Theory 
In order to enhance the conception of equality of opportunity, it would 
require for our courts to rule that section 15 prohibits constructive discri-
mination or the adverse effect of legislation. Section 15 makes no reference 
to intent, purpose or effect. 
We find reference to the adverse effect of a distinction in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination " and in the 
Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms according to which : 
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the 
effect of nullifying or impairing such right.12 
Historically in Canada, proof of intent to discriminate was required 
under human rights legislation proscribing discriminatory acts occurring 
"because o f a prohibited ground of discrimination. Later, boards of inquiry 
began to examine only discriminatory results. The respondent's motivation 
or intention was irrelevant, except in mitigation of penalty. 
It was the first judicial consideration that found the discriminatory 
result to be prohibited and not that discriminatory intent. The question 
centered upon an Alberta equal pay case and the issue was considered by 
Mr. Justice McDonald 13. 
In 1981, in O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears14, discrimination was alledged 
on the basis of religion since the applicant refused to work on Saturdays on 
account of his religion. The Board of Inquiry held that discriminatory result 
was sufficient. It was reversed by a majority of the Divisional Court and 
once again unanimously by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
In Bhinder 15, the Federal Court of Appeal decided that sections 7 and 10 
of the Canadian Human Rights Act16 are not sufficiently comprehensive to 
include indirect discrimination insofar that it "adversely affects" a protected 
11. Article 1. 
12. Supra, note 6, a. 10. 
13. Re Attorney-General for Alberta and Gares, (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 635, p. 695 (Alta S.C.). 
14. (1981) 2 C.H.R.R. D/267. The Supreme Court of Canada heard this case on January 29, 
1985. 
15. C.N.R. Co. v. C.H.R.C. andK.S. Bhinder, (mi) 4 C.H.R.R. D/1404, Mr. Justice LeDain, 
dissenting. Heard by the Supreme Court on January 29, 1985. 
16. S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, and amendments. 
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class. Only when there is an intention to discriminate or to treat differently is 
discrimination prohibited. Furthermore, there is no duty to accommodate 
religious belief since there is no specific wording to that effect. 
The Court ruled that the definition including the notion of "adverse 
effect" focusing more on the consequences of actions rather than on the 
actor's state of mind, requires an "anchor" , i.e. a legislative basis. Such an 
"anchor", says the Court, in not found in the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
However there is an "anchor" in international instruments ratified by 
Canada and the provinces in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women " and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination '8. 
Furthermore, article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights relating to equality rights does not explicitely refer to effect. 
It was interpreted as not requiring evidence of direct discrimination. This 
was so in a case where several Mauritian women challenged an immigration 
law requiring alien husbands but not alien wives of Mauritian nationals to 
obtain residence permits. If the permits were refused, there was no appeal. 
Furthermore, a law on deportation subjected the alien husband to an 
eventual expulsion. A mauritian woman who married an alien would be 
discriminated against on the basis of sex since the laws had the effect of 
preventing that woman from exercising one of her rights, namely that of 
protecting the family " . 
It is appropriate to quote Mr. Justice Tarnopolsky in R. v. Videoflicks. 
Regardless of whether the courts have, with respect to the determination of the 
distribution of powers and the characterization of laws in relation thereto, 
looked to "intent" or "effect" or to both, 
in my view the interpretation of the Charter necessarily requires an assessment 
of the "effect" of impugned legislation. Intent and purpose will undoubtedly 
still have relevance. For the most part, however, in determining the appropriate 
balance between government action on the one hand and individual rights as 
set out in the Charter on the other, it will be the determination of the "effect" 
or "effects" of impugned legislation that is most important. While a law may 
have a legitimate purpose, its actual operation may result in the infringement 
of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. In the absence of legislative 
resort to s. 33 of the Charter, it will be rare indeed that legislation will have the 
direct and open purpose of taking away Charter rights or limiting Charter 
freedoms. An adverse impact, however, can occur as a result of the operation 
and enforcement of legislation or even because of its intended scope. To ignore 
17. Article 4; entry into force in Canada on January 10, 1982. 
18. Article 1 ; entry into force in Canada on November 13, 1970. 
19. Communication R.9/35. 
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the "effect" of the Act in issue before this Court would be to ignore reality and 
to concede the rights of the individual or a minority to the interests of the 
majority, even if these interests appear legitimate as far as the majority are 
concerned.20 
Equality rights are not absolute. They can be limited by a general 
limitation clause and derogated by an overriding clause. 
3. Section 1 of the Charter 
The limitation clause under section 1 of the Charter provides that rights 
guaranteed under the Charter are "subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society". 
Section 1 provides that the limit must satisfy those four conditions. 
The test of "reasonableness" is constitutionalized ; its meaning and 
scope is left to the courts. Judges are invested with the power to examine the 
reasonableness of the law, its rationality. 
Mr. Justice Deschênes21 distinguished between the end and the means 
in considering the burden of proof which rests on the shoulders of the party 
claiming the benefit of an exception. The party which claims the benefit of an 
exception must demonstrate its applicability. 
Since the justification is the end, the burden of justification rests upon 
he who claims the benefit of the exception. In this particular case, Quebec 
had to prove the legitimacy of Bill 101's aims with respect to education. 
In deciding whether such a rational connection exists the courts should attach 
due weight to Parliament's determination, if Parliament has addressed the 
question. Where empirical data might validate an inference that would not 
appear to be warranted by common experience, I would be prepared to 
examine any information made available to Parliament [...] which might tend 
to establish a rational connection... " 
However, in the absence of legislative resorting to the notwithstanding 
clause of section 33, under no circumstances can a limitation constitute an 
exception to the rights and freedoms or amount to amendments of the 
Charter. Without deciding whether section 1 applies or not to section 23 on 
language rights, the Supreme Court ruled in the A.-G. Québec v. Association 
of Protestant School Boards21 that section 1 cannot be the equivalent of a 
20. R. v. Videoflicks, (1984) 9 C.R.R. 193, 212 (Ont. C.A.). 
21. Québec Association of Protestant School Boards et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec (n° 2) 
(1983), 140 D.L.R. 33, 57-58 (Que. S.C.). 
22. R. v. Oakes (1983), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 339, p. 363 (Ont. CA.). 
23. A.-G. Quebec v. Québec Association of Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66. 
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derogation authorized by section 33. Some limitations cannot be legitimatized 
by section 1. 
4. Derogation clause : Section 33 
The derogation clause allows both Parliament and provincial legislatures 
to retain a limited power to pass laws that may conflict with parts of the 
Charter governing fundamental freedoms, legal rights and equality rights24. 
It is possible to derogate to the right to freedom of conscience and religion25 
as well as to freedom of thought2 6 , to the legal right to life, liberty and 
security of the person2 7 and most importantly to the right to equality28. 
However, the derogation clause does not affect the provision guaranteing 
rights equally between men and women, the section relating to the minority 
language educational rights and the aboriginal rights. 
The derogation clause has been the object of concern expressed by 
members of the Human Rights Committee when Canada presented its 
supplementary Report in October 1984. 
One member even said that the derogation under article 33 did not 
comply with article 4 of the Covenant which refers to the State of emergency, 
since "it allowed for derogation from rights that were non derogable under 
the covenant"2 9 . 
Under article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, we read that : 
When a public emergency which threatens the life of a nation arises and it is 
officially proclaimed, a state party may derogate from a number of rights to the 
extent strictly required by the situation. The state party, however, may not 
derogate from certain specific rights and may not take discriminatory measures 
on a number of grounds, namely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin...'0 
In times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all the 
more important, particularly these rights from which no derogations can be 
made, including the fact that "[e]very human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life"31. 
24. Referring to sections 2 and 7 to 15. 
25. Section 2(a). 
26. Section 2(b). 
27. Section 7. 
28. Section 15. 
29. Section 28. 
30. Supra, note 1, a. 4. 
31. Id., a.. 6. 
142 Les Cahiers de Droit (1986) 27 c.deD.135 
Furthermore, no derogation is allowed under the Covenant with regard 
to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion32. 
The Government of Canada explained the existence of section 33 in the 
following terms : 
In the course of the constitutional debate leading to the adoption of the 
Charter, concern had been expressed that legitimate policy interests of 
Parliament or the legislatures might be overridden by the judiciary. As a result, 
section 33 had been incorporated in the Charter, but only for issues relating to 
fundamental freedoms, legal rights and equality rights. 
With one exception, no Government had availed itself of section 33 of the 
Charter. The National Assembly of Quebec had incorporated a notwithstanding 
clause in every provincial statute, whether adopted before or after the entry 
into force of the new Constitution. By that decision, the Government of 
Quebec indicated its disagreement with the process leading to the new 
Constitution, and with its contents. It was in no way opposed to the protection 
and promotion of human rights. Indeed, the Government of Quebec had 
amended the Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec to ensure 
that, in areas falling under its jurisdiction, all persons in Quebec would enjoy 
protection similar to that afforded by the Constitution. 
The Quebec Charter solemnly affirmed fundamental rights and freedoms 
recognized in international instruments, recognized fundamental freedoms 
such as the right to life, assistance, freedom of conscience, religion, opinion, 
expression and association, the right to privacy, dignity, honour and reputation, 
as well as the right to the sanctity of the home and its contents. It also 
guaranteed the right to equality by prohibiting any discrimination based on 
race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age, religion, 
political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a 
handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap. It also recognized 
political, judicial, economic and social rights.33 
However, to what extent can we feel that citizens are equally protected 
under a provincial Charter or Code when it can be amended by the 
legislature in order to include its own notwithstanding clause? 
One of the alternatives that could be contemplated by the Quebec 
Government in response to a judgment made by a Superior Court Judge, 
who found language-law provisions forbidding bilingual signs contrary to 
the Quebec Charter34, is not to amend the law in question, but to amend the 
Charter with a notwithstanding clause in connection with language rights. 
This only illustrates that fundamental freedoms, the right to life, liberty 
and security and equality rights should not be subject to an overriding clause 
under the Canadian Charter. 
32. Id.,a. 18. 
33. CCPR/C/SR. 558. 
34. Forde. P.G. Québec, [1985] CS. 147. 
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Conclusion 
Section 15 is not only the responsibility of lawyers, politicians or the 
judiciary. 
Individuals and groups can and should promote equality through their 
relationship towards one another. The reasonable limits to equality rights 
will depend upon the norms of society and the priorities set by Canadians. 
Laws and programmes alone cannot achieve true equality. 
The issues of equality in Canada should be addressed in view of creating 
a society which will reach a better understanding of different groups and 
enhance its awareness of the need to recognize differences in a climate of 
mutual respect. 
